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SOME VITAL PRINCIPLES OF THE A ERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT*
JOHN H. HATCHER
Many people regard our national Constitution as complex. A
modern humorist, Goldberg, fairly expressed the popular attitude
in this manner: "I am glad to vote for the Constitution so long
as I don't have to read it." This attitude is unfortunate. The
constitutionality of a law may not be clear; but the vital principles
of American Constitutional Government are as plain as the Ten
Commandments. The conscience of the people should be awakened
recurrently to the simplicity and the perfection of our plan of
government, for the Bill of Rights, which is perhaps the greatest
single document of human rights ever drawn by man, admonishes
that "Free government and the blessings of liberty can be pre-
served to any people only by... frequent recurrence to funda-
mental principles."
Most governments which existed prior to 1787, had been arbi-
trarily or fortuitously formed. They had also been impaired, or
improved by circumstances usually beyond human foresight. Our
national government was founded differently. It was the result
of patriotic wisdom and of popular consent. True, the founders
lived in the age of horse and coach, but for that we should be
thankful. The moderate pace of that age afforded opportunity for
deliberation; the speed of the present age discourages thought be-
yond the curve ahea& It is an historical fact that no country save
ancient Greece ever furnished at one time as many great states-
* An address delivered before the Student Body of the College of Law, West
Virginia University, March 16, 1937.
** Member of the Supreme Court of Appeals, Charleston, W. Va.
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men as did America during the constitution-forming period. Our
nation is thirty times as populous now, but we have not yet matched
the genius of the constitution-makers. They were deeply versed in
political science. They knew the strength and the weakness of
every preceding form of government, and they sought to fashion
a government without inherent civil malady. They were not mere
theorists, however; they were in fact very practical politicims,
Every state had been under constitutional government since 1776.
Prior thereto, every colonial charter had been, in effect, a consti-
tution. So the framers and their fathers before them had actually
lived for more than a century under various forms of constitutional
government. Theory only aided experience in ripening the na-
tional Constitution. Moreover, the terrible plight of the people
in 1787 forced the framers to be sincere as well as practical. "We
must take man as we find him," said Alexander Hamilton. Man
as they found him was not ordinarily dependable whether as a fol-
lower or a leader. As a follower, he was generally emotional and
beguiled by catchy slogans; as a leader, he was generally egocentric
and unmindful of earlier promises. Every failure in government
was attributed by the framers to the incapacity or the selfishness
of man. Their impatience with political altruism was reflected in
this sentence of Thomas Jefferson: "In questions of power.., let
no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from
mischief by the chains of the constitution." And so the framers
designed a government in which laws were set above men; a gov-
ernment with legal checks to protect men from their own im-
providence and their own opportunism.
The genitor of our constitutional government is the principle
that the people are the sovereign power of a nation. One of the
first official statements of that postulate appears in a declaration
of rights (afterwards called the Bill of Rights) made by the repre-
sentatives "of the good people of Virginia" on June 12, 1776, "as
the basis and foundation of government." Prior to 1776, there
had been no national recognition of that principle for many cen-
turies. Popular sovereignty is an ancient idea. It dominated
Greece at one time, Rome at another. It flourished among the
early Nordic tribes, whose freemen decided public questions by a
loud shout, and we may well surmise, by knocking on the head any
persistent minority opposition. All the ancient popular govern-
ments had fallen prey to those we would now call gangsters. The
chief gangsters then called themselves kings and invented the
2
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absurd dogma that they ruled by divine right; nevertheless, the
dynasty of each king was generally started and perpetuated by
gangster methods. Every large nation of Europe was still domi-
nated by such gangsters in 1776, when the American colonists re-
verted to the age-old idea that the people - not the kings -- were
sovereign. A corollary of that idea is that a government derives
its just powers only from the consent of the governed. In that
conception beats the heart of constitutional government. Conform-
ing to that idea, the national Constitution is proclaimed with the
line: "We the people ... do ordain and establish this Constitu-
tion." That instrument, therefore, is simply an ordinance of the
people authorizing public officials to administer government. It
follows that anything those officials do at variance with the Con-
stitution is usurpative because they have no authority except what
the Constitution confers. So, we the people should rid ourselves
of any notion that governmental officials are our masters, for they
are not; they are merely our servants executing our constitutional
orders.
The aspiration of constitutional government is the popular
welfare. In aid whereof, the Constitution again borrowed from
the Bill of Rights the fundamental doctrines that the personal con-
duct of the citizen, as well as his property rights, should be invio-
late from governmental interference, except through due process
of law. And bear in mind that any official interference with per-
sonal liberty or private property not authorized by the Constitu-
tion, is not due process of law.
Continuity of constitutional government is ensured by the
division of governmental powers. All such powers are embraced
in the right to make, the right to construe, and the right to execute
law. Unite those three powers in one man or one group of men-
and the risk of tyranny is gravely increased. Separate those three
powers effectually and orderly government should result. The
separation of governmental powers had become "an axiom in the
science of government," said James Madison to an early Virginia
Assembly. The Constitution of Virginia, adopted June 29, 1776,
expressly provided: "The legislative, executive and judiciary de-
partments shall be separate and distinct, so that neither shall exer-
cise the powers properly belonging to the other." A like division
of governmental powers, while not expressly declared, is explicitly
recognized in the national Constitution. Division of power alone,
however, would not have conserved our system. The founders well
3
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understood that while each department of power must be kept dis-
tinct in office, yet to prevent autocracy and secure co~peration each
department must be connected with, and in some manner amenable
to the others. Their understanding was clearly voiced by Alex
Contee Hanson of Maryland in 1787 when he said in defense of
the Constitution: "I am apprised of the almost universal dis-
position for the increase and abuse of power .... The perfection
of political science consists chiefly in providing mutual checks
amongst the several departments of power." Because of this un-
derstanding, never before had there been a clearer separation of
legislative, executive and judicial departments; never before had
the checks between these departments been so carefully considered
or so well adjusted. These checks are the sinews of constitutional
government.
Looking over the work of the founders, from the vantage
ground of 1936, Fred Rodell, a Professor of Law, Yale University,
observes: "And the cleverest and most effective restriction they
used was ... the splitting up of the government into three dif-
ferent branches, each with some sort of check on the others."'
That restriction is arranged in the following manner: The execu-
tive power of the federal government is vested in the President
with the right to appoint certain officials, the right to make treaties,
and the right to veto acts of Congress. But his appointments are
for the most part subject to the check of senatorial confirmation,
his treaties are subject to the check of senatorial concurrence, and
his veto may be overridden by two-thirds of Congress. Further-
more, the constitutionality of executive action may be tried by
the federal courts, and the integrity of such action may be tried
by the Senate. The entire judicial power of the federal govern-
ment is vested in the federal courts. But the President nominates
and, with the advice and consent of thq Senate, appoints the
judges; and they are answerable for official misconduct before the
Senate. Certain legislative powers are vested in Congress. But
Congress itself is divided into two branches, for the purpose that
each may check the other; every state is given two senators, so that
the smaller states may check the senatorial influence of the larger
ones; and congressionali legislation, is subject to the check of presi-
dential veto, as well as to the check of judicial review.
The learned James Wilson of Pennsylvania, thinking little of
RODELL, FH'Y-FIVE MEN (1936) 220 (a sensible book deriving its title
from the number of delegates who attended the Federal Convention.)
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the efficacy of an oath, said to the Federal Convention in 1787,
that an oath was "a left-handed security only." But the other
framers, not agreeing with him, provided as a final cheek on de-
partmental power that every official should swear (or affirm) to
support the Constitution. When the other checks on usurpation
are thus capped by the check of the constitutional oath, it would
seem that constitutional government should be secure against un-
due expansion of departmental power, as long as officials should
be men~to whom an oath is not merely a left-handed security
In one of his historical works, Woodrow Wilson records that
the early administrations of our government were amazingly suc-
cessful, and.were so because they were "simple, inexpensive and
unmeddlesome." That method of administration is precisely what
the founders intended, since the Bill of Rights enjoins a firm gov-
ernmental adherence to moderation and frugality. That initial
success welded the nation into a constitution-minded people.
All that constitutional government has done need not be re-
cited. Suffice to say it has waged successfully live separate wars;
it has withstood a number of depressions, some of which were more
trying to the people generally, than the one just endured; it has
attempted to curb monopoly and special privilege, to guard the
health of the nation, and to preserve our national resources'against
private waste; and it has afforded more freedom, greater material
comfort and fairer opportunity to every class of citizens than any
other government, past or present. It could not change man's
nature and make him essentially moral and just, nor can any
other form of government. It has not eliminated inequality, ex-
ploitation or injustice, nor have the socialistic dictatorships of
Europe; but our government has come nearer doing so than any of
them. Unless the angels should condescend to govern mankind, an
administration free from blame should not be expected. Human
administration cannot rid itself of human fault. What constitu-
tional government has accomplished, demonstrates that when fairly
administered, it is adequate for the needs of a free and prosperous
people.
Since the framers were so wise, since they designed our Con-
stitution with such care, and since constitutional government has
been comparatively so successful, I would be concerned at any
change whatever in our system of government. I could tolerate a
number of amendments without actual alarm, if the vital principles
of the government were not disturbed. However, despite the na-
5
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tion's unprecedented progress, one of those principles is threatened.
A school of political thought, newly revived in this country, has
become impatient with the division of governmental powers. Ac-
cording to a sympathetic analyst, this school "envisages the legis-
lative authority as the supreme authority of government; and
endeavors to adapt this authority to modern conditions. . . . by
associating -with it Presidential leadership .... 2  Under modern
conditions Presidential leadership is but a more acceptable term
for P'esidential domination. So, those fine phrases but thinly
veil the vision of a dictatorship.
This school is an extension of one which dominated a number
of the states prior to 1787. It sought then to establish the legis-
lature as the supreme authority of the state. It curried favor with
the populace by passing a series of laws for the relief of debtors,
laws described in The Federalist (No. VII) as "atrocious breaches
of moral and social justice." It was thoroughly discredited then,
and its reanimation now is due to recent judicial decisions that
several acts of Congress are unconstitutional. It would capitalize
against the courts whatever discontent has followed those decisions.
It has drawn recruits from all the political parties. It numbers
among its exponents some university professors, some newspaper
editors and some Congressmen, as well as other men of influence.
Consequently, this school should have the gravest consideration.
In sorrow more than in censure, I charge that this school has
failed to comprehend the past, has failed to conceive the present
and has failed to envisage the future. The school has not compre-
hended the past, else it would know that supreme legislative power
under ' executive domination, as proposed by it, had always con-
stituted the very definition of tyranny. Thomas Jefferson wrote
that "the generalizing and concentrating of all (governmental]
cares into one body" had destroyed liberty in every government
which had done so. The school has not conceived the present, else
it would realize that such concentration of governmental power, as
it proposes, produced the recent dictatorship in our own state of
Louisiana, and the present dictatorships of Europe. Due to the
protection of the federal courts, the people of Louisiana were de-
prived of little, if any, personal liberty. But, according to General
Smuts, a competent authority on world affairs, there is less "free-
dom of thought, speech, action (and] self-expression" in the totali-
2 CoRwn, TuE TwmiGnT oP THE SUPREE COURT (1934) 148.
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tarian nations of Europe today "than there has been during the
last two thousand years." If the future may be judged by the past
and the present, this revived school has not envisaged the future,
else it would foresee that such concentration of governmental
power, as it proposes, would inevitably result in curtailment, if not
destruction, of our personal liberty.
Some of the school admit willingness to stand by the Consti-
tution if it be treated as "made for an undefined and expanding
future" (Marshall). I have no fault with that proviso, for I find
nothing in the Constitution or in the attitude of the framers to
intimate that constitutional government was not so designed. They
did not conceive that our Constitution was perfect. They had no
thought of a refrigerated government. They knew that change is
frequently more conservative than stability. Madison expressly
warned the Federal Convention that "In framing a system which
we wish to last for ages, we should not lose sight of the changes
which ages will produce." So the framers anticipated and made
express provision in the Constitution itself for orderly constitu-
tional amendment. This provision was designed so as to delay a
proposed amendment until the people should have time for delib-
eration. Complaint is made by the revived school that this delay
precludes resort to amendment in emergencies. Wherefore, some
exponents of the school would, on occasion, set executive leadership
above the Constitution. They would justify their position by the
act of President Jefferson in making the Louisiana Purchase, and
by the act of President Lincoln in signing the Emancipation
Proclamation, both of which they assert were intentional acts of
usurpation. Both references are inept. The Louisiana Purchase
was included in a treaty negotiated with France. President Jef-
ferson was at first doubtful of constitutional authority to make
the purchase. He so wrote Wilson C. Nicholas saying: "If, how-
ever, our friends shall think differently, certainly I shall acquiesce
with satisfaction." Their friends did think differently. Congress
was called in special session; the Senate ratified the treaty; the
House voted bonds to pay for The Purchase; and then Jefferson
signed the treaty. The Constitution confers on the President the
power to make treaties, "with the advice and conscut of the Sen-
ate." That power, of necessity, includes the right to agree on the
terms of treaties. The Constitution also makes treaties so con-
cluded, the supreme law of the land. Thus, the treaty with France,
7
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including the Louisiana Purchase, made by the President and ap-
proved by the Senate, became the supreme law of the land and the
Supreme Court stilled the Jeffersonian critics of that day with
these unequivocal words: "The Constitution of the United States
confers absolutely on the government of the Union the power of
making war and of making treaties. Consequently, that govern-
ment possesses the power of acquiring territory either by conquest
or by treaty."'  And the court expressly recognized the validity
of the Purchase in a number of cases. 4
The Emancipation Proclamation was a war measure, taken
by President Lincoln under his constitutional warrant as war
leader. The following language of the Proclamation not only pre-
sents its own justification but shows his thought to have been that
he was proceeding constitutionally: ". . . . Now, therefore, I,
Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, by virtue of the
power in me vested as commander-in-chief of the army and navy
of the United States, and as a fit and necessary war measure for
suppressing said rebellion ..... do order and declare .... And
upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted
by the Constitution upon military necessity I invoke the considerate
judgment of mankind . . . ." Mr. Lincoln's unrestricted power
to determine what were acts of military necessity and the lawful-
ness of the Proclamation as an e-.ercise of that power, were ex-
pressly recognized not only by the Supreme Court of the United
States but by the courts of southern states as well., When both
the Louisiana Purchase and the Emancipation Proclamation have
been consistently upheld by the highest courts of the land, how
willful is this political school which still asserts that both acts were
unconstitutional! 'Or is it merely like the owlet, who, sailing
athwart the noon, "drops his blue-fring'd lids and holds them
close, and hooting at the glorious sun in heaven, cries out, where
is it?"
As further precedent for executive absolutism, this school
emphasizes the refusal of President Jackson to honor a decision
of the Supreme Court. I would point the people to Woodrow Wil-
son's estimate of Jackson based largely upon that refusal: ".
3 American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U. S. 511 (1828).
4 Foster and Elam v. Neilson, 27 U. S. 253, 301 et seg. (1829); Garcia v.
Lee, 37 U. S. 511 (1838) ; Pollard v. Files, 43 U. S. 591 (1844) ; United States
v. Lynde, 78 U. S. 632, 643 (1870).
5 Texas v. White, 74 U. S. 700, 728 (1868); Slaback v. Cushman, 12 Fla.
472, 475 et seg. (1868) and authorities cited.
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he [Jackson] was the sort of man who might very easily twist and
destroy our whole constitutional system, were the courts robbed
of their authority, and the great balance wheel of their power
shaken from its gearings.' '
To foment dissatisfaction w:th the federal judiciary, this
school stresses the remark of Chief Justice Hughes, when Governor
of New York, "We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution
is what the judges say it is." That remark, if accusatory, was so,
like many other epigrams, mainly to be clever. For, who else save
the judges have the constitutional right to say finally what the Con-
stitution is? And they are well within their prerogative as long"
as their saying is a reasonable interpretation of the words, the
spirit and the purpose of the Constitution. Should they say arbi-
trarily what it is, they would be subject to impeachment; for they
hold office only during good behaviour and such conduct would
not be good behaviour. Chancellor Kent, who walked with the
founders and knew their thoughts on this subject, said in his intro-
ductory lecture to the Columbia University Law School in 1794,
that in case the federal judiciary substituted "arbitrary will" for
"rational judgment .... the judges may be brought before the
legislature [Congress] and tried and condemned and removed from
office.' ' Thus, whenever the federal court has pronounced a stat-
ute unconstitutional, the conduct of the court in turn may be
judged; and that judgment is lodged by the Constitution in the
Senate, a branch of the very body whose enactment has been in-
validated. This provision has proved an ample check on judicial
despotism. I am aware that following certain constitutional deci-
sions, the Court has been arraigned severely in the halls of Con-
gress. Justice Story, in his later years, resented such attacks, say-
ing that one of the functions of the Supreme Court was to "per-
petually thwart the wishes and views of demagogues." He further
said that since the Court had no patronage to distribute, it had no
defenders against insidious attack of thwarted politicians, except
defense by "the wise and the good." The failure hitherto of all
partisan attacks on the Court in Congress would show, according
to Story, that Congressional wisdom and goodness have concurred
in what the Court has said the Constitution is.
6 WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1908) 160.
7Kent's Introductory Lecture (1903) 3 COL. L. REv. 330, 377. Accord:
TnE FEDERALIST, No. LXXIX.
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The irrational antagonism of the revived school against the
federal courts would indicate that it has again closed its lids, like
the owlet, rather than observe the proper constitutional status of
the courts. Neither narrow nor inconsistent judicial decisions can
affect that status. The Constitution no more exacts broad vision
and absolute consistency of the judicial department than of the
executive and legislative departments. With full appreciation of
judicial fallibility, the framers nevertheless conferred upon the
federal courts the untrammeled judicial power of the United States.
In the proper exercise of that power, those courts must deciare the
law. The Constitution is a law (so defined in Article VI) ; and its
construction is essentially as much a judicial act as the construction
of any other law. An act of Congress pursuant to the Constitution
is law; an act unauthorized by the Constitution is not law. The
office of the courts, in this respect, has never been stated more
clearly than in a recent opinion of Associate Justice Roberts, as
follows: "When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in
the courts as not conforming to the constitutional mandate, the
judicial branch of the Government has only one duty, - to lay
the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute
which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with
the former." 8 In the squaring, however, the method of the Court
should not be Procrustean. Industry, society and other vital forces
have changed since 1787. As those forces change, the interpreta-
tion of the instrument which would control them must be reason-
ably adjusted to the changes. The final thought in constitutional
construction must be the present, not the past. A man who has
not demonstrated that he regards the Constitution in this spirit
should not be appointed to the bench. If a federal judge has not
this spirit, that fault is no argument against the judicial depart-
ment or against the threefold division of governmental powers;
that fault is chargeable solely to want of care in his selection. Some
federal judges have been ultra-conservative; but, led by Marshall,
most federal judges have been progressive. An infrequent deci-
sion, such as that in the New York Minimum Wage Law case, may
disappoint some friends of the Supreme Court. Their disappoint-
ment should be composed upon reviewing the long list of liberal
8 United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312 (1936).
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laws which have been upheld." That list reflects customary liberality
of construction; that list sustains the judicial plan of the framers.
A change in the present retirement systemh of federal judges
should be of no great consequence, if made solely to improve judi-
cial quality or efficiency, and if the independence or the dignity of
the courts would not be affected. The number of federal judges, or
the number required to invalidate an act of Congress, is not of para-
mount importance, unless thereby the integrity of the courts is im-
paired. Because of difference of opinion some former executive may
have decried, or scolded or even chastened the courts, but that is no
warrant for a later executive doing so. The Constitution itself
confers on the executive department no dominion whatever over
the judiciary. The temper of the Federal Convention thereon was
shown in the summary rejection of a motion, providing that judges
might be removed by the President upon the application of Con-
gress, Gouverneur Morris saying: "It is fundamentally wrong to
subject judges to so arbitrary an authority". Rather let later
executives revert to the kindly judicial conception of James Madi-
son, sometimes called the father of the Constitution, who said to
the first federal Congress that the judges of the Supreme Court
"are the guardians of the laws and the Constitution of the United
States." Let later executives also catch the vision of Woodrow
Wilson, who declared that this judicial guardianship must not be
disturbed if we are to maintain "that nice adjustment between
individual rights and governmental power which constitutes polit-
5". . . . the limitation of hours of employment in mines and smelters
(Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366); the requiring of redemption in cash of
store orders or other evidences of indebtedness issued in payment of wages
(Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13); the prohibition of contracts
for options to sell or buy grain or other commodities at a future time (Booth
v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425); the forbidding of advance payments to seamen
(Patterson v. Bank Eudora, 190 U. S. 169); the prohibition of contracts to
pay miners employed at quantity rates upon the basis of screened coal instead
of the weight of the coal as originally produced in the mine (McLean v. Arkan-
sas, 211 U. S. 539) ; the regulation of the size and weight of loaves of bread
(Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U. S. 578; Peterson Baking Co. v. Bryan, 290
U. S. 570); the regulation of insurance rates (German Alliance Insurance Co.
v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389; O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Insurance Co., 282
U. S. 251) ; the regulation of the size and character of packages in which goods
are sold (Armour & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U. S. 510); the limitation of
hours of employment in manufacturing establishments with a specified allow-
ance of overtime payment (Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426); the regulation
of sales of stocks and bonds to prevent fraud (Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242
U. S. 539); and the regulation of the price of milk (Nebbia v. New York, 291
U. S. 502." From dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice in Morehead v.
New York, 298 U. S. 587, 628, 56 S. Ct. 918 (1936).
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ical liberty." Whenever the citizen's idea of his constitutional
right conflicts with the legislative or the executive department's
idea of its constitutional authority, orderly government must fur-
nish an impartial forum, where the conflict may be debated and
determined. The courts constitute that forum. It is in this sense,
wrote Mr. Wilson, "That the whole efficacy and reality of consti-
tutional government resides in the courts ..... it is in this sense
that our judiciary is the balance-wheel of our entire system."''1
Centralization of power results from popular ignorance and
apathy as much as from despotic intention. Before this revived
school arrays the legislative and executive departments against, the
judicial, let the people take thought. Can the radical ends of this
school conceivably be of mnore importance to the people than the
maintenance of divided governmental powers? Mr. Rodell says
that the economic distress which preceded the Federal Convention
in 1787 was caused by a rampant democracy in the states which
"soaked the rich with paper money laws, 'levelling laws', high
taxes on business, and other schemes tending toward a more equal
distribution of wealth. And [he proceeds] the delegates, found-
ing a national government to stop that sort of stuff in the states,
wanted none of it in the government they were founding.""' So
they had the Constitution provide: "No state shall ... make any
thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass
any . . . ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of con-
tracts." The framers recognized the immutable fact that since the
abilities and the aspirations of men are unequal, inequality of per-
sonal achievements and personal acquisitions must naturally fol-
low, if men are permitted to exercise those abilities and pursue
those aspirations; and that such imparity will exist as long as
liberty exists. If there was one thing more than any other upon
which the founders were touchy, it was the preservation of that
personal liberty for which many of them had risked their lives on
the battle fields of the Revolution. Hence, they did not purpose
that the national government should control individual enterprise
or coddle one group of citizens at the expense of the others. On the
contrary, an express reason advanced in the Federal Convention
for having checks on governmental power was that the checks would
10 WISON, op. cit. supra n. 6, at 18, 142-3.
11 ODELL, FnFT-FIVm MEN 167-8. Accord: SMITH, THE SPIRIT Or AmERIcAN
GOVERNMENT (1912) 297 et seq.; 5 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE PEDERAL CON-
STITUTiON (1845) 120, 136, 138, 162-3, 484-5; U. S. CONST. Art. 1, § 10.
12
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [1937], Art. 2
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol43/iss3/2
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
stop laws of that character.12 President Wilson spoke in spirit
with the founders when he said: "It is still intolerable for the gov-
ernment to interfere with our individual activities except where
it is necessary to interfere with them in order to free them."
Liberation of individual action, however, whether from monopolis-
tic, industrial, or other restraint, does not require a change in our
policy; such liberation, if and when necessary, can be accomplished
under the present provisions of the Constitution or through amend-
ment. But, every proposal to improve human relations should be
weighed as the founders counselled, by its probable effect on man
as he is, rather than on man as we would have him to be. After
nearly one hundred and fifty years of national progress without
such laws as pestered the states in 1787, let the nation ponder well
whether many of such laws shall be re-enacted, lest those laws
destroy the morale of their beneficiaries, bankrupt the government,
and re-occasion conditions described by James Madison as "dis-
tracted and disheartening." Before the people heed the quixoti-
cal teachings of this revived school, let them first study the prac-
tical teachings of the founders. Then, let the common sense of
America determine whether the framers were wrong when they
divided governmental powers in order to check man as they knew
him. If that policy was not wrong in 1787, what change has come
since in human nature to warrant that man be unchecked now?
My three score years have observed no such change. And I can-
not conceive of man as a ruler needing no official restraint, until
that millennium shall have dawned, which was envisioned by John
The Disciple when on the Isle of Patmos.
12 5 ELLIOT, op. cit. supra n. 11, at 138, 186, 203, 334.
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